This paper examines the behaviour of the …nance premium following technology and monetary shocks in a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model where borrowers use a fraction of their production (output) as collateral. We show that this simple framework is capable of producing a countercyclical …nance premium, while matching the macro dynamics of well-documented stylized facts.
Introduction
Much of the recent research in Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models with credit market imperfections focuses on the role of the …nance premium and its dynamic behaviour in business ‡uctuations. A substantial amount of empirical evidence indicates to a countercyclical …nance premium (see De Graeve 2008 , Nolan and Thoenissen 2009 , Gerali, et al 2010 , Aliaga-Díazand Olivero 2011 . 1 In general, in order to explain the behaviour of the …nance premium the literature focuses on the borrowers'net
worth. Yet, the assumptions made about the borrowers'net worth can result in opposing theoretical conclusions. In the Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) models, the …nance premium is countercyclical, whereas in the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) model the …nance premium is procyclical. In the latter paper, the absence of entrepreneurial capital stock implies that shocks that increase the price of capital have no direct impact on borrowers'net worth and this results in a procyclical …nance premium. 2 This result is also reached by others that build on the CarlstromFuerst model, such as Gomes, Yaron and Zhang (2003) and De Fiore and Tristani (2009) , who also produce a procyclical …nance premium following a monetary shock. Faia and Monacelli (2007) , also build on the Carlstrom-Fuerst model, but modify the behaviour of the probability of default in order to obtain a countercyclical …nance premium. As the production of intermediate goods, in their model, is separated from the production of capital, with only the latter engaging into borrowing, the behaviour and productivity of the intermediate goods …rms, do not a¤ect the probability of default. A critical assumption therefore in Faia and Monacelli (2007) is to assume that the mean distribution of investment outcomes across capital producing entrepreneurs depends also positively on the state of aggregate productivity. This implies that a higher aggregate productivity and output, raise also, the income of borrowers, thus reducing the probability of default and producing a countercyclical risk premium.
This paper makes a simple point. Using a standard DSGE model we show that when a fraction of total production (or …nal output) can serve as the borrower's collateral, the model is capable of producing a countercyclical …nance premium, following both technology and monetary policy shocks, while matching the macro dynamics of welldocumented stylized facts, without further assumptions about the borrower's net worth, as those employed elsewhere the literature. Intuitively, most of the collateral that may 1 As with most of the macro literature by countercyclical we refer to a falling premium as output rises, unlike some other literature that refers to the opposite e¤ect.
2 For a detailed comparison of these two models, see Walentin (2005 there is a probability of default that can be endogenously determined by the cut-o¤ value of an idiosyncratic productivity shock. Using this and a break-even condition for banks, we derive a countercyclical …nance premium over the risk-free re…nance rate. The latter, in this model, is not the result of an assumption made about the mean distribution of investment outcomes. With all output producing …rms engaging in borrowing, and with borrowing decisions made before shocks are realized, any innovation that reduces …nal output also reduces the real value of collateral that the lender receives in case of default.
This means that falls in output endogenously increase the probability of default and raise the …nance premium, thus generating a countercyclical …nance premium. The …nance premium is endogenously a¤ected by the default probability, which in this model is itself a function of the loan rate and hence the …nance premium. Through the latter e¤ect, technology and monetary shocks amplify the spread between the loan and …nance risk-free rates, thereby generating an accelerator e¤ect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, whereas section 3 discusses its steady state and equilibrium properties. Section 4 calibrates the model under technology and monetary shocks and section 5 concludes.
3 Note that in Townsend's (1979) seminal work on the costly state veri…cation framework, the realized value of bank-…nanced investment projects (which are all subject to an idiosyncratic shock) can be seized in case of default. In Agénor and Aizenman (1998) working capital must be paid for prior to production and output is subject to an idiosyncratic productivity shock. In that model, realized output is in a sense "produced" by loans, just as project outcomes depend on bank …nancing in Townsend's framework. Here we go a step further by interpreting the fraction of actual output that lenders can seize in case of default in the Agénor-Aizenman framework as ex post collateral that can be pledged by borrowers.
The Model
We consider an economy where a continuum of identical …rms, j 2 (0; 1), use the labour services of all existing household types, i 2 (0; 1), to produce di¤erentiated consumption goods. Households supply labour to …rms, consume goods from all …rms and at the end of each period receive pro…ts from …rms and banks. Firms need to cover labour costs entirely by borrowing but their production is subject to aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The credit market is represented by a competitive commercial bank that receives deposits from households, borrows from the central bank and extend loans only to …rms.
Asymmetric information implies that …rms must pledge a fraction of output as collateral.
Deposit and loan rates are derived based on arbitrage conditions.
The timeline of the model is as follows. First, the bank receives deposits from households and liquidity borrowed from the central bank and makes decisions on its lending rate, subject to the idiosyncratic nature of its borrowers (…rms) and the cost of borrowing from the central bank. Then shocks are realized, …nal goods become available and employment, loans and prices adjust by taking the going interest rate and loan rates as given. Only a fraction of …rms can adjust their prices, as the rest are assumed to keep prices …xed in a Calvo-fashion. In the end of each period, loans must also be repaid and pro…ts are distributed to households.
Households
The objective of household i is to maximize,
where E t is the expectations operator conditional on information available at t. C t is aggregate consumption; h i;t is working time by household type i; 2 (0; 1) a subjective discount factor, and , N , > 0. The household's budget constraint is,
where i D t is nominal interest on deposits, D t ; W i;t is the nominal wage rate paid to household i; and T t is a lump-sum tax. 4 The consumption index is,
where C j;t is the consumption of product j and p > 1. The demand for each di¤erenti-ated good is, C j;t = P j;t Pt p C t , where the average price index,
.
The …rst-order conditions of the above problem are,
where t+1 = (P t+1 P t )=P t .
The Wage Setting
The wage setting follows a variant of Erceg, Henderson and Levin, (2000) 
w . In each period a constant fraction of 1 ! w workers are able to re-optimize their wages while a fraction of ! w index their wages according to last period's in ‡ation rate, i.e. W i;t = t 1 W i;t 1 . From (1) and the above problem, the wage in ‡ation is derived as 5 ,
where M RS (C;N );t = N N t C 1= t and the real wage is de…ned as,
where, b t is the log-linearized in ‡ation rate as a deviation from its steady state.
Firms
The production of each …rm relies on the labour services provided by the competitive labour contractor, but it is also subject to aggregate technology and idiosyncratic shocks,
5 The full derivation of the wage setting is provided in the Appendix.
where N j;t denotes the amount of labour services hired by …rm j, at the nominal aggregate wage W t ; Z j;t is the total level of productivity of …rm j; A t is an aggregate technology shock and " j;t is an idiosyncratic productivity uniform shock, distributed over the interval ("; "). As employed elsewhere in the literature, the assumption of the uniform distribution is to pin down the cut-o¤ point (see Faia and Monacelli 2007) . The aggregate technology shock evolves in the conventional autoregressive process, log A t = 1 A log A + A log A t 1 + A t , where, A > 0 and A > 0 is the steady state aggregate productivity level;
A t is a normally distributed random shock with zero mean and a constant variance, A .
Firms borrow from the bank to cover their expected wage costs, W t N j;t , at the gross nominal interest rate 1 + i L t , and repay their loans at the end of each period. Let L j;t denote the nominal amount of borrowing by …rm j at time t, the …nancing constraint in real terms is thus,
where L R j;t L j;t =P t . The collateral that the bank can seize in case of default consists of a fraction, 2 (0; 1), of the …rm's production (i.e. …nal output), net of state veri…cation and contract enforcement costs. Consequently, a …rm will choose to default if
where the left-hand side is …rm j's actual repayment following a default, whereas the right-hand side is the contractual repayment, expressed in real terms. Let " M j;t be the cut-o¤ point, below which default occurs; that is, the value of " j;t for which (9) holds as an equality. Using (7) yields,
Using (8), holding with equality, this expression can be rewritten as,
6 In a recent paper, Jermann and Quadrini (2012) , assume that working capital includes not only payments to workers, but also payments to suppliers of investments, shareholders and bondholders.
Financial Intermediation
At the beginning of each period, the bank receives deposits from households and additional liquidity borrowed from the central bank, L B t , at the going re…nance rate, i t .
7
Assuming no required reserves, the (aggregate) balance sheet of the bank is,
Perfect competition in the deposits market (and no required reserves) implies, i D t = i t . We next turn to the derivation of the lending rate, i L t . The bank faces the risk of default as …rms' …nal output (i.e. at the end of period t), is subject to random shocks, hence contractual repayments are uncertain. A loan contract speci…es a premiuminclusive lending rate that is set as a break-even condition. Speci…cally, this condition requires that in equilibrium the expected income from lending to …rm j, is equal to the cost of borrowing these funds from the central bank at the given marginal cost, i t . Let, E t S t be the expected income from lending L j;t , the break-even condition is,
To derive the …nance premium, % L t , that satis…es (12), we recall that in the event of default the bank seizes a fraction, , of the realized value of the …rm's output, thus it receives a net repayment, Y j;t (see eq. 9). We can thus write the expected income from loans in real terms as,
where f (" j;t ) is the density function of " j;t . Equation (13) can be rewritten as,
Substituting (11) 
M j;t )N j;t , in the second term on the right-hand side of the above equation, we obtain,
7 The additional liquidity borrowed from the central bank, here is equivalent to the assumption of an exogenous cash injection of M t M t 1 in Ravenna and Walsh (2006) . Here we assume that excess liquidity is covered by a nominal lump sum tax, i.e. L B t = T t . This, together, with the bank's balance sheet, where at equilibrium L t = W t N t , determines also the level of deposits, D t .
Substituting the break-even condition (12) in real terms, E t S R t = (1 + i t )L R j;t , into (15), and dividing through by L R j;t we obtain the loan rate as,
where the …nance premium is,
To obtain further insight, we use the properties of the idiosyncratic productivity shock.
" t follows a uniform distribution over the interval ("; "); its probability density therefore is 1=( " ") and its mean " = ( " + ")=2. Under these assumptions % L t simpli…es to,
where t 2 (0; 1) is the probability of default,
Thus, the loan rate is set as a premium over the going re…nance rate. The …nance premium is determined by the ratio of the size of real revenue lost in times of default (that is, for realizations of " t less than " M t ), to the real value of total loans (see also Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist 1999). Speci…cally, the …nance premium is shown to be a function of the expected size of loans, the size of and a quadratic function of the probability of default, t , that is itself determined (i.e. through " M t ) by the size of . As implied by (11), a higher fraction of collateral, , increases the cost of default, thereby reducing the frequency of defaults (hence " M t ); this reduces the default probability and the lending rate. If there is no default risk ( t = 0), the premium is zero, and i L t = i t :
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Once the state of the economy is revealed, at the end of time t, each …rm has a Calvo-type constant probability, ! p , of keeping its price …xed at the previous period's price and a constant probability of 1 ! p of adjusting to the new optimal price based on the new real marginal cost and treating the loan rate as given, (see eq. 16). Total real cost is, 8 Because from (6) and (11) the size of " ), is the stochastic discount factor between time s and t + s. From (19), and taking the loan rate as given, the NKPC is
where, b x, is the log-linearized x, as a deviation from its steady state; = (1 ! p )(1 
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is conducted through a conventional Taylor-type interest rate rule,
where, i 2 (0; 1) captures the degree of interest rate smoothing; y ; > 0 are policy parameters and i t is a normally distributed random shock with zero mean and a constant variance, i .
Equilibrium and Steady State
At equilibrium, markets for labour, goods, deposits, and credit must clear, thus at the macroeconomic equilibrium, aggregate output must be equal to aggregate consumption, Y t = C t . Note that the small fraction of output lost in times of default is already incorporated in these variables. This is because collateral in this model is already given as a fraction of output, and thus the level of output, and hence consumption, are endogenously a¤ected by size of collateral and the probability of default. = # w N C 1 and Z = A " ; " = ( " + ")=2, and the steady state loan rate is,
2 . From equations (11) and (18) for and taking into account that the steady state real price is unity, we obtain, =
where
Hence, the steady state probability of default is positive and depends endogenously on the mean productivity level of the …rm, (i.e. " ), the size of the …rm's price markup, # p , and the degree of credit market imperfections, as measured by . Note, that unlike Faia and Monacelli (2007) , the mean productivity of the idiosyncratic shock here is independent of A, and it is determined purely by the properties of the uniform distribution, i.e. " = ( " + ")=2.
Parameterization and Simulations
To simulate the model we use the well-established parameterization proposed by Christiano Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), also used in Smets and Wouters (2003) . As similar work and data on the cost of bankruptcy parameter, is limited, we assume that the fraction of actual output seized by the bank in case of default is = 97%;
9 Note that here we have used the fact that at the symmetric price equilibrium, mc = 1=# p .
that is we assume that an equivalent amount of 3% of output is spent in monitoring costs, veri…cation costs, legal procedures etc.; however, we also consider a lower value of, = 0:85. Note that for a typical value of a price markup, # p = 1:2, and = 0:97, and choosing, as in the rest of the literature, a value for the range of the idiosyncratic shock, " = 1; and " = 1:35, such that the model produces reasonable values, the steady-state value of the probability of default is = 0:027, or around 3%. This is very similar
to the values assumed elsewhere in the literature. For example, Faia and Monacelli (2007) calibrate their model to generate an average bankruptcy rate of 3%, whereas
Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) also assume that the probability of survival in business is approximately 97%. Figure 1 , shows the impulse responses to a 0.25% negative technology shock ( A t ), under the base model (Table 1) , with = 0:97 (solid line) and = 0:85 (dotted line).
Technology Shocks
[ Figure 1 . Impulse Responses to a Technology Shock ]
The fall in productivity reduces initially output and raises in ‡ation and nominal interest rates, while as prices rise faster than nominal wages, real wages fall gradually. This response is consistent with much empirical evidence, (see Smets and Wouters 2003) . In addition, the fall in productivity and output, in this model, reduces the size of collateral and this raises the probability of default. The latter e¤ect is re ‡ected on a higher lending rate, driven by a countercyclical …nance premium over the risk-free re…nance rate. The latter spread is gradually eliminated as output starts rising and the probability of default starts to fall. The countercyclical behaviour of the …nance premium is also supported by a number of studies, (see above). Employment is shown to be procyclical, hence as output falls and the cost of borrowing increases (i.e. due to the higher default probability and loan spread), the demand for employment falls and so is the demand for loans; this is also in line with much empirical evidence. Note that with = 0:85, the above e¤ects are ampli…ed. There is a higher probability of default, which is shown by a marked increase in the loan spread which is followed by a rise in in ‡ation and a higher interest rate. The higher cost of borrowing increases the marginal cost, reduces output and employment and thus the demand for loans. through the probability of default. Therefore monetary shocks here a¤ect the probability of default and thus the borrowing constraint of the …rm through various channels. 10 In particular, the fall in demand resulting from a higher re…nance rate, results in a sharp fall in output, (see also Jermann and Quadrini 2012) . The shock also reduces employment and wage in ‡ation, but initially, and in line with the price puzzle, it raises the in ‡ation rate as a result of both e¤ects (a) and (b) above. 11 In line with much empirical evidence, prices respond much more sluggishly than output and the in ‡ation rate remains positive for about 3-5 quarters before it becomes negative, (see Smets and Wouters 2003) . As nominal wages catch up with prices, real wages start gradually to return to their steady state. The fall in output raises the probability of default and hence the lending rate, thus generating again a countercyclical …nance premium.
Monetary Shocks
[ Figure 2 .
Impulse Responses to a Monetary Shock ]
A lower raises the probability of default and, as with the technology shock, this raises the lending rate and the loan spread. In the case of a monetary shock this raises (through the e¤ects (a) and (b) above), the real marginal cost which also raises the in ‡ation rate.
As expected, the higher cost of borrowing results in a lower demand for employment and loans.
Concluding Remarks
Using a simple DSGE framework, where a fraction of output is pledged by borrowing …rms as collateral, we show how to derive, from break-even conditions, a loan rate that is driven by a countercyclical …nance premium over the risk-free re…nance rate. The …nance premium is shown to be a¤ected by the probability of default, both directly, but also through the way that the default probability is itself a function of the loan rate, the re…nance rate and the …rm's productivity. Thus the …nance premium provides an accelerator e¤ect through which both monetary and technology shocks can amplify the loan spread. The response of the macro variables to such shocks appears to be consistent with much of the established empirical literature, including the price puzzle. Similarly, the …nance premium is countercyclical and causes the loan spread to peak within the …rst quarter following a shock and remain positive for about two years. Its dynamic behaviour therefore, is also consistent with much of the recent empirical literature on the cyclicality of loan rates, (i.e. Mojon and Peersman 2003 , De Graeve 2008 , Aliaga-Díaz and Olivero 2010 , Gerali, Neri, Sessa and Signoretti, 2010 .
Our simple framework can also be extended to account for investment, that may strengthen the role of output as collateral. As pointed out by Faia and Monacelli (2007) , for example, credit frictions can have a large impact on the behaviour of investment and the price of capital. 
Appendix (Not for Publication)
The Wage Setting Following Erceg, Henderson and Levin, (2000) and Smets and Wouters (2002) , the composite homogenous labour is,
with w > 1. The i th household therefore faces the following demand curve for its labour,
where W t denotes the aggregate nominal wage paid for one unit of the composite labour, N t , used in the production of each …rm. Substituting (23) in (22), results in the economy wide wage equation,
We assume that each period a constant fraction of 1 ! w workers are able to re-optimize their wages while a fraction of ! w index their wages according to last period's in ‡ation rate ( t 1 ). These households therefore set their wages according to the following rule,
With indexed wages, if wages have not been set since period t; then at period t + s; the real wages for household j will be,
:::: t+s 1 : Therefore, the demand for labour in period t + s becomes,
Households who set wages, maximize (1), subject to the budget constraint (2) and the demand for labour (27) . From (1),
The …rst order condition with respect to W i;t results in, 
If all households can re-optimize, (i.e. ! w = 0), equation (28) 
where M RS (C;N );t = N N t C
1=
t . In equilibrium all re-optimizing households choose the same wage (W t ) and the optimal relative wage in a log-linearized form (denoted by hat) evolves according to, 
where the real wage is de…ned as,
where b t is the log-linearized rate of in ‡ation.
The log-linearized system Log-linearized variables are denoted by hat and represent log-deviations around their steady state values, or percentage point deviations in the case of interest rate and the in ‡ation rate. 12 The log-linearized equations are as follows,
Euler Equation,
where E t b t+1 = E t b P t+1 b P t as the expected log deviation of in ‡ation from its steady state value (assuming = 0)
Total loans (in real terms) where,
Productivity Shock,
where, c
Probability of default (in percentage points),
Lending Rate,
NKPC: b t = E t b t+1 + c mc 
-------
